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INTRODUCTION
The historical model of companies obtaining patents in order to
practice them and business competitors asserting their patents
against each other has been transformed. Much more frequently,
patent owners are commercially exploiting their patents through
licensing and litigation, rather than practicing the underlying
inventions. By far, the most prevalent example of this can be seen
Ahmed J. Davis is a Principal in the Washington, D.C. office and Karolina Jesien is
an associate in the New York office, respectively, of Fish & Richardson P.C. The views
expressed in this piece are those of the authors alone and should not be ascribed or
attributed to the Firm or any of its clients. This article developed from a talk given at
made at the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and Entertainment Law Journal‘s
2011 Symposium entitled ―IP Bullying or Proactive Enforcement?‖
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in the rise of non-practicing entities (NPEs), otherwise known
pejoratively as patent trolls.1
A patent troll is an entity that focuses solely on capitalizing on
patent portfolios.2 The troll purchases or otherwise obtains patents
from other companies for purposes of licensing and enforcing
them, rather than practicing any inventions covered by those
patents. NPEs may acquire patents from companies that are
bankrupt, those that no longer practice the patents they own, or
those that are seeking revenue from enforcement but lack sufficient
capital to do so on their own.3 A typical business model for an
NPE is to acquire patents that apply broadly across a particular
industry (often business method patents), identify potential
infringers, threaten litigation, and then either collect license fees
from those entities or bring lawsuits against those that refuse to
license.4
Litigating through trial is usually the last resort. An NPE‘s real
objective in bringing suit is to pressure defendants into early
settlements.5 In patent cases, the threat of a permanent injunction
historically loomed large because, until relatively recently,
injunctions were virtually guaranteed against an adjudged
infringer.6 In cases where NPEs join large numbers of defendants,
even modest settlements per defendant quickly add up,

1

For the purposes of this article, the terms ―patent troll‖ and ―NPE‖ will be used
interchangeably, even though some NPEs may not necessarily be considered patent trolls
(e.g. universities, failed companies, individual inventors).
2
In 2001, NPEs brought approximately one hundred lawsuits targeting five hundred
operating companies, while in 2010, the numbers increased to more than five hundred
lawsuits targeting over 2,300 operating companies. See Litigations Over Time, PATENT
FREEDOM, http://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012)
(reporting data obtained as of January 9, 2012).
3
Vaikhari Rajkumar, The Effect of Patent Trolls on Innovation: A Multi-Jurisdiction
Analysis, 1 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. LAW 33, 35–36 (2008), available at
http://www.commonlii.org/in/journals/INJlIPLaw/2008/3.html.
4
See id. at 34 (defining a patent troll as ―[a] company or business function whose
primary business activity is to acquire patents for the purpose of offensively asserting
them against other companies.‖).
5
See id. at 34–35.
6
Id. at 38. (―[A] general rule had developed such that virtually automatic permanent
injunctions would be issued against any party that was found to have infringed a
patent.‖).
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contributing to the troll‘s ―war chest‖ and allowing them to
perpetuate the practice.7
Many critics view the patent system as having failed the
practicing entity and true research and development (R&D)
organizations by allowing trolls to exploit defects in the system. A
recent Boston University study asserts that patent trolls have cost
innovators over $500 billion in lost wealth over the last two
decades.8 Since trolls have little incentive to reach cooperative
business resolutions given that they do not compete in the
marketplace with the alleged infringers, companies effectively are
left with two options: take a license to the patents being asserted or
litigate. A troll‘s ability to extract high settlements by playing on
the defendants‘ fears of permanent exclusion from the market has
been viewed as a deterrent to innovation.9 The troll has power
under the monopoly granted by a patent, it is said, to pull the plug
on an entire operation and possibly drive a (small) company
entirely out of the market.10 Because trolls are non-producing
entities, they are immune from infringement countersuits and the
coincident bargaining for cross licensing agreements.
What‘s more, trolls often litigate on a contingent fee basis,
which makes them less vulnerable to litigation costs than the
companies they are suing. This leaves defendants with high
exposure but little bargaining power, which can result in high
settlements for trolls, even if the asserted claims are of dubious
validity; due to high litigation costs and the high risk to the
7

See, e.g., Why Use Acacia: Typical Arrangement with Patent Holders, ACACIA
RESEARCH GRP. LLC, http://www.acaciaresearchgroup.com/whyuse.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2012). Acacia has been labeled ―the mother of all patent trolls.‖ Gene Quinn, Mother
of All Patent Trolls, Acacia Research, Gets More Funding, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 10, 2010
2:10 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/08/10/patent-trolls-acacia-researchfunding/
id=12017/.
8
James E. Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs
of Patent Trolls 4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45 (Sept. 19, 2011)
(Revised November 2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship
/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf (―Aggregating the
change in market capitalization over two decades, we find that the aggregate loss of
wealth to these firms exceeds half a trillion dollars.‖).
9
Rajkumar, supra note 3, at 36.
10
See, e.g., id. at 35 (discussing Pangea Intellectual Properties, a California company
that ―sent letters to hundreds of small businesses seeking licensing fees of $25,000 on
average.‖).
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practicing entity, settlements tend to occur at the early stages of
litigation, before the issue of validity of the claim is even reached.
Patent trolls thus are in a unique position that enables them to
negotiate licensing fees that are often grossly out of proportion to
the contribution they have made to making products or providing
services.11
In response to the abundance of criticism, the patent system is
moving towards effectively responding to systemic concerns raised
by patent troll practices. While the marketplace creates incentives
for trolls to monetize patents, these are being counterbalanced by
the Courts and the legislature, albeit at a slower rate. Over the last
few years, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have stepped in
with rulings aimed at limiting some of the abusive tactics used by
NPEs in patent litigation. Congress also has enacted legislation
targeted specifically at patent trolls and by committing to study the
effect of the new law on troll behavior.
I. BASICS OF PATENT RIGHTS
The Constitution grants Congress the power ―[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .‖12 Congress has used this power to
give inventors ―the right to exclude others‖ from practicing the
inventions underlying their patents.13 Thus, contrary to general
belief, a patent grant is not a right to practice an invention per se
but rather a right to exclude others from practicing it. Thus,
Congress gave the inventor—as well as his heirs or assigns—the
11

For example, one of the highest settlements came from Research In Motion (RIM),
the provider of the BlackBerry, which was sued in 2001 by NTP, an NPE entity, alleging
that the BlackBerry infringed on several of its patents. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Following a jury verdict of
infringement, the trial court issued a permanent injunction, which was stayed pending
appeal to the Federal Circuit. The threat of shutting down BlackBerry service to over six
million subscribers forced RIM to settle the lawsuit for $612.5 million. See Ian Austen,
BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2006, at C6, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE1DA1431F937A35750C0A9609C
8B63.
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
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choice of enforcing a patent or electing not to enforce it, or
alternatively licensing or selling it to another for enforcement.
There can be little doubt that, even if unintended, the ―heirs or
assigns‖ includes patent trolls. Some view them as pariahs and
others as vultures, but there is a case to be made that even vultures
play a role in a well-functioning society.14
When Abraham Lincoln stated in 1859 that ―the patent system
added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius,‖15 he likely did not
envision the system that currently exists. In the 1800s, there was a
notion that patent rights were granted to those who would
contribute to the greater good by increasing the public store of
knowledge, ultimately making something useful.16 But the benefit
afforded patentees was to recognize and encourage innovation.17
Almost two hundred years later, patent trolls have come along and
changed the game by monetizing patents in a different way, but in
a way that spurs innovation no less.
While a patentee/inventor essentially holds a limited monopoly
for a time, issuance alone does not realize the economic potential
or economic benefit of a patent. A patent needs to be enforced to
be monetized. If the cost of enforcement is too high, the market
dictates that the patent owner will either not take steps to enforce
the patent or will sell or license the patent to another entity that has
the resources to enforce it.18 By creating this incentive to
exchange goods and maximize profits, the market has helped
patents evolve from mere exclusionary instruments into assets that
have value.
This is evidenced by the recent high settlements (e.g. the RIM
settlement mentioned earlier), high monetary awards for
14
See, e.g., Bessen et al., supra note 8, at 6; Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/1241494164.shtml (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
15
OECD-BMBF WORKSHOP ON GENETIC INVENTIONS, IPRS, AND LICENSING
PRACTICES, THE PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC INVENTIONS IN EPO PRACTICE (2002),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/27/1820221.pdf
16
See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 183–91 (2004), available at
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=llr.
17
See id.
18
See generally Anupam B. Jena & Tomas Philipson, Cost-Effectiveness as a Price
Control, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 696 (2003).
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infringement, and high price tags paid for patent acquisitions. In
June 2011, the Supreme Court upheld a $290 million award against
Microsoft in a patent dispute brought by a Canadian software
company, i4i Limited Partnership, claiming that Microsoft Word
infringed its patent.19
Also in June 2011, Canadian
telecommunications equipment maker Nortel Networks sold more
than 6,000 patent assets to an alliance made up of Apple,
Microsoft, and other technology companies for $4.5 billion.20
The question is: why is this problematic? Given that we live in
a society that is based on a free market, the market ought to correct
itself if troll activity presents a problem. In fact, there is a
plausible argument that troll activities make the market more
efficient by dealing with the enforcement and licensing processes
and allowing inventors to focus on inventing. It could also be
argued that trolls actually foster innovation by providing liquidity
and ensuring that independent inventors are compensated for their
inventions. In reality, the courts and Congress take the opposite
perspective, responding to the troll situation through rulings and
legislation that curb those troll practices that are viewed as
problematic.
II. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN
One of the most significant changes to the patent troll
landscape is the Supreme Court‘s ruling in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC.21 Until eBay, permanent injunctions were
virtually guaranteed in patent cases.22 This provided patent trolls
with a very powerful tool and enabled them to extract large
settlement payments from practicing entities, for which the threat
19

Adam Liptak, Microsoft Loses Appeal in $290 Million Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2011, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/business/10biz
court.html?_r=1.
20
Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (JULY 1, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/
apple-and-microsoft-beat-google-for-nortel-patents/.
21
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
22
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(―Although the district court‘s grant or denial of an injunction is discretionary depending
on the facts of the case, injunctive relief against an adjudged infringer is usually
granted.‖) (internal citations omitted).

2012]

BALANCE OF POWER IN PATENT LAW

841

of being enjoined was too great to risk. In 2006, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the Federal Circuit‘s articulation of ―‗a
general rule,‘ unique to patent disputes, ‗that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.‘‖23 The Court made clear that patent owners, like
everyone else, must satisfy the traditional four-factor test24 to get a
permanent injunction, including irreparable harm, a difficult factor
for an NPE to prove.
The eBay decision shifted significant leverage away from
NPEs, as practicing entities have less incentive to settle early in the
case because there is no longer the threat of a looming injunction.
Especially where they can economically sustain a monetary
damages award, practicing entities may be more likely to continue
litigating and see cases through to the merits. The Supreme
Court‘s awareness of the patent troll issue is evidenced in Justice
Kennedy‘s concurring opinion in eBay, where he recognized that
―[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees.‖25 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
―[f]or these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to
buy licenses to practice the patent.‖26
Courts have continued to grant injunctions in patent cases after
eBay, but only within the proper framework. In applying the fourfactor test, for example, courts are considering whether the
plaintiff is competing in the marketplace with the accused
infringer, thus exhibiting a more stringent treatment of NPEs over
23

eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94 (citing Mercexchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
24
Id. at 391.
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction..
Id.
25
Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
26
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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companies that actually practice their patents. Indeed, courts are
more likely to find irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary
damages, and thus issue an injunction, where parties are
competitors.27 On the other hand, when parties do not compete
and the patentee has a history of licensing the patent, courts are
less likely to issue an injunction because monetary damages are
likely sufficient.28
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT STEPS IN
The Federal Circuit has also taken a more active role in
tailoring precedent to the changing legal landscape with respect to
trolls. In recent years, we have seen developments in the areas of
willfulness, declaratory judgments, venue, and fee-shifting that
indicate an acknowledgement by the court that it has a role in
balancing the rights of practicing entities against patent trolls.
A. Willful Infringement and Enhanced Damages
The Federal Circuit has significantly altered the standard
governing willful infringement and limited the circumstances for
awarding enhanced damages. In rejecting the previous ―duty of
care‖ willfulness standard, the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate held
that ―proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages
requires at least a showing of objective recklessness‖; that is, ―a
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.‖29 Once this
standard is satisfied, the patentee must further show that ―this
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer.‖30 This decision
works against patent trolls in two ways. First, it lowers the risk of
27

See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int‘l, Inc., 2008 WL 928496, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (―Courts routinely find irreparable harm, and therefore grant
permanent injunctions where, as here, the infringer and the patentee are direct
competitors.‖).
28
See generally, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) (finding that licensing company did not demonstrate irreparable harm and that
any harm could be remedied by monetary damages).
29
In re Seagate Techn., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30
Id.
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a finding of willful infringement by the accused infringer. Second,
it also lowers the possibility that a judge or jury will award
enhanced damages against an accused infringer.
This is
significant, on the heels of the eBay case, because it further curtails
the leverage that trolls have historically exerted against practicing
entities.
B. Declaratory Judgment
Another way the Federal Circuit has singled out patent trolls is
in lowering the standard for a case or controversy that arises in
declaratory judgment contexts. In Hewlett-Packard v. Acceleron,
Hewlett-Packard (―HP‖) sued a patent holding company for
declaratory judgment of non-infringement after it received a letter
from Acceleron to ―call [HP‘s] attention to‖ a patent acquired by
Acceleron and asking for ―an opportunity to discuss this patent‖
with HP.31 After Acceleron disregarded HP‘s proposal of a mutual
standstill agreement, HP brought the declaratory judgment suit.
The Federal Circuit found that Acceleron‘s actions were sufficient
to support a declaratory judgment action, a decision which the
court recognized ―undoubtedly marks a shift from past declaratory
judgment cases.‖32 Most notably, the court ―observe[d] that
Acceleron is solely a licensing entity, and without enforcement it
receives no benefits from its patents.‖33 The court explained that
―[t]his adds significance to the fact that Acceleron refused HP‘s
request for a mutual standstill,‖ and held that, based on the facts of
the case, ―when viewed objectively and in totality,‖ there was a
―definite and concrete dispute between HP and Acceleron,‖ thus
giving rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction.34 This holding
suggests a lower bar for declaratory judgment jurisdiction when
the patentee is a patent holding company.
C. Transfer
The Federal Circuit also has limited another tool used by patent
trolls to gain an advantage over practicing entities—venue. A

31
32
33
34

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id.

844

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:835

common tactic used by trolls has been to bring suits in the
patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas against large numbers
of defendants that are scattered throughout the country such that
there is no other venue that could be more convenient for the
majority of the defendants. More often than not, the NPEs have no
real ties to the Eastern District of Texas but it is a desirable forum
for patent holders. Over the past two years or so, the Federal
Circuit has taken notice and has been removing cases filed by trolls
out of Eastern District of Texas via writ of mandamus,
notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of such a request.
For example, in April 2011, the Federal Circuit granted a
petition for writ of mandamus sought by forty-one defendants (all
in the finance industry) that were sued for patent infringement by
Realtime Data, LLC, an NPE headquartered in New York.35 The
petitioners had moved to transfer the case to the Southern District
of New York where the plaintiff and twenty-seven defendants were
located. Similarly, in November 2010, the Federal Circuit granted
Microsoft‘s petition for a writ of mandamus from an order denying
a motion to transfer a patent infringement lawsuit brought by
Allvoice Developments.36 Allvoice, a licensing company based in
the United Kingdom, incorporated in Texas sixteen days before
filing the suit and opened an office in Texas even though it did not
employ any individuals in that office, or anywhere else in the U.S.
for that matter. Also in November 2010, the Federal Circuit
granted Oracle Corp.‘s petition for writ of mandamus to vacate the
denial of a motion to transfer the patent infringement suit filed by
the patent holding company Financial Systems Technology (Intell.
Property). Despite the parties having previously entered into an
agreement that identified the Eastern District of Texas as the venue
for future litigation between them, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court‘s reliance on this fact alone in denying transfer was
plainly incorrect as a matter of law. These are only a few of a long
line of recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has ordered a case
to be transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas to a more

35

In re Morgan Stanley et. al, Misc. Nos. 962, 964, 967, 2011 WL 1338830, at *1
(Apr. 6, 2011).
36
See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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convenient forum.37 The impact of these decisions removes a
typical arrow from the trolls‘ quiver, creating a more level playing
field between patent trolls and the practicing entities should the
cases ultimately make it to a jury trial.
D. Exceptional Case
In a clear expression of disdain for the practice of patent trolls,
the Federal Circuit on July 29, 2011 unanimously upheld a finding
of an exceptional case and awarded $489,000 in attorney fees and
$141,000 in Rule 11 sanctions in a patent infringement suit
brought by Eon-Net, a patent holding company, against Flagstar
Bancorp.38 The finding was based on Eon-Net‘s litigation
misconduct, lack of pre-filing due diligence, and the filing of a
baseless litigation in bad faith.39 The court found that ―Eon-Net
acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.‖40
The court specifically pointed to the fact that Eon-Net had ―filed
over 100 lawsuits against a number of diverse defendants alleging
infringement of one or more patents from the Patent Portfolio,‖
and that ―[e]ach complaint was followed by a ‗demand for a quick
settlement at a price far lower than the cost of litigation, a demand
to which most defendants apparently have agreed.‘‖41 In addition,
the court criticized Eon-Net for ―the ability to impose
disproportionate discovery costs on Flagstar . . . at least in part,
because accused infringers often possess enormous amounts of
potentially relevant documents that are ultimately collected and
produced.‖42 Further, ―Eon-Net placed little at risk when filing
suit [because] [a]s [an NPE], Eon-Net was generally immune to
counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair
competition because it did not engage in business activities that

37

See, e.g., In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
38
Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
39
Id. at 1326–28.
40
Id. at 1327.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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would potentially give rise to those claims.‖43 Although it was
based on a specific set of facts, this decision could put patent trolls
at risk of facing significant litigation penalties for engaging in the
traditional business model of filing numerous lawsuits and
demanding quick settlements.
While this specifically relates to trolls, at least one Federal
Circuit judge has advocated the importance of bi-lateral application
of this provision to patent ―grasshoppers‖ as well as trolls. In his
September 2011 ―State of Patent Litigation‖ address to the Eastern
District of Texas Judicial Conference, Chief Judge Rader
explained that both sides have the responsibility to police
themselves and that fee-shifting would go a long way to advancing
that goal:
Every ―troll‖ discussion, however, needs a note of
balance. Just as trolls litter the patent system with
marginally meritorious lawsuits, so the system also
suffers from the IP ―grasshopper‖ [which is] the
entity that is quick to steal the ―inventor-ant‘s‖
work and research investment [and] refuses to pay
any license fee until his legs and claws are held to
the proverbial litigation fire . . . A grasshopper is
any entity which refuses to license even the
strongest patent at even the most reasonable rates.
Frankly, I am not sure who causes more meritless
litigation—the troll asserting patents beyond their
value or the grasshopper refusing to license until
litigation has finally made it impossible to avoid.44
As Judge Rader articulated, a ―fullscale reversal‖ of fees and
costs would go a long way to remedial treatment of litigation
abuses.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
In view of the threat that eBay caused to the traditional patent
troll business model, the hottest current battleground between trolls
43

Id.
Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, E.D. Texas Judicial
Conference (2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/files/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf.
44
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and practicing entities is at the United States International Trade
Commission (ITC), a federal agency that adjudicates allegations of
intellectual property infringement to determine any impact on
domestic industry. The ITC has the authority to issue exclusion
orders that direct U.S. Customs to stop infringing products from
entering the U.S. and to issue cease and desist orders against
importers and others that engage in unfair competition.45 Because
the ITC is an administrative agency granting remedies under 19
U.S.C. § 1337 and not the Patent Statute, the Supreme Court‘s
eBay holding does not apply. Thus, although there are no
monetary damage awards available, the threat of an exclusion
order prohibiting importation of a particular good can be very
effective in driving settlements from practicing entities.
The current hot issue at the ITC relates to what qualifies as a
―domestic industry.‖ In April 2010, the ITC held that the litigation
costs incurred while enforcing patents in multiple district court
lawsuits, which result in patent licenses, are enough to qualify as a
domestic industry.46 But the Federal Circuit has already stepped in
and imposed some limitations on this holding. In Mezzalingua
Associates, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit affirmed an ITC ruling
that the appellant did not satisfy the ―domestic industry‖
requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 337(a)(3)(C), which provides that
the requirement is satisfied when there is ―substantial investment
in [the patent‘s] exploitation, including engineering, research and
development, or licensing.‖47 According to the Federal Circuit, a
single license granted for the asserted patent by the appellant, and
the years of litigation costs leading up to the execution of the
license, were not sufficient to satisfy the domestic industry
requirement because the costs were not all incurred with the
objective to obtain a license (other objectives included obtaining
an injunction) and, as a result, the investment in licensing was not

45

What the USITC Is . . . and Isn’t, U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/gen_info.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
46
Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Prods. Containing
Same, Investigation No. 337-TA-650 (ITC Apr. 14, 2010) (public version), available at
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2010/ITC.650.decision.pdf.pdf.
47
John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
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―substantial.‖48 Although this ruling likely will not affect licensing
companies incurring substantial litigation costs, it could have an
effect on smaller-scale licensing companies and NPEs that have
few licensing deals but high litigation costs.
V. CONGRESS ENACTS THE AIA
There can be little doubt that Congress had NPEs in mind when
it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which was
signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011.
Section 34 of the AIA expressly provides that ―[t]he Comptroller
General of the United States shall conduct a study of the
consequences of litigation by [NPEs], or by patent assertion
entities, related to patent claims made under title 35, United States
Code, and regulations authorized by that title.‖49 Such a study
―shall‖ include ―[t]he economic impact of such litigation on the
economy of the United States, including the impact on inventors,
job creation, employers, employees, and consumers‖ and ―[t]he
benefit to commerce, if any, supplied by [NPEs] or patent assertion
entities that prosecute such litigation.‖50
The most immediate impact on NPEs will be newly added 35
U.S.C. § 299 (Section 19 of the AIA), limiting joinder in a single
suit of unrelated parties. As already mentioned, it has become
common for NPEs to file patent infringement actions against large
numbers of defendants with little in common in terms of their
industry or the products or services they provide. As part of this
tactic, NPEs select defendants located throughout the U.S. and not
concentrated in any particular area, such that there is no single
venue convenient for the majority of defendants. Some courts
have been more tolerant of this tactic than others, one example
being the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas, where juries
are also likely to award generous damages. Whereas allowing for
joinder of multiple defendants in a single action had been intended
to serve to enhance efficiency in litigation where certain factual

48

Id. at 1341.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 § 34(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in sections of 35 U.S.C.).
50
Id. at § 34(b)(5) and (6).
49
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questions were shared among all defendants, the NPEs have used
this tool as a means to force defendants to act collectively and
inhibit each defendant‘s ability to protect its own interests on its
own terms. The AIA appears to have taken this advantage away
from the NPEs.
The new section 299 provides that in a patent infringement
action,
parties that are accused infringers may be joined in
one action as defendants or counterclaim
defendants, or have their actions consolidated for
trial, or counterclaim defendants only if—(1) any
right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences relating to the
making, using, importing into the United States,
offering for sale, or selling of the same accused
product or process; and (2) questions of fact
common to all defendants or counterclaim
defendants will arise in the action.51
Indeed, section 299 requires that there be another basis for joinder
beyond an allegation that all defendants have infringed the same
patent: ―accused infringers may not be joined in one action as
defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions
consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each
have infringed the patent or patents in suit.‖52 It also appears that
Congress has recognized that there exist circumstances where
defendants may find strength in large numbers and an ability to
achieve efficiencies through cooperation, and has accordingly
provided defendants with an option to waive the requirements of
Section 299.53
As a practical effect, NPEs will no longer be able to capitalize
on economies of scale and will likely be forced to file as many
patent infringement lawsuits as there are defendants. This means
51

Id. at § 19.
35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2006).
53
35 U.S.C. § 299(c) (―A party that is an accused infringer may waive the limitations
set forth in this section with respect to that party.‖).
52
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that each lawsuit will likely be filed in (or ultimately transferred
to) the venue where each defendant has its principal place of
business or is organized. The new law greatly reduces the
efficiencies that NPEs had created by asserting a single patent
against a laundry list of defendants. More importantly, however,
the new law will cause the validity of the asserted patent to be
placed at risk every time the patent is asserted.
It is also clear that Congress does not necessarily believe that
its work is done with respect to the troll situation. The AIA
requires the Comptroller General to submit, one year after the
enactment of the AIA, a report with the results of the study
mentioned above ―including recommendations for any changes to
laws and regulations that will minimize any negative impact of
patent litigation that was the subject of such study.‖54 Thus,
Congress appears to anticipate that further changes to the patents
laws and regulations may be needed down the road, depending on
the effect that the AIA will have on NPEs. This is at least an
indication that Congress is keeping a close eye on the practices of
NPEs and their economic impact, and that it will continue to
modify the law as change becomes necessary.
CONCLUSION
Despite criticism of the patent system in the context of patent
troll concerns, the law is moving inexorably to where it needs to
be. There is a tradeoff occurring—the NPEs file the cases and
Congress and the courts are stepping in where necessary. The
reality is, and the market dictates, that patent trolls will continue to
find ways to navigate the patent laws in an attempt to monetize
patents. But recent decisions of the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit, and the America Invents Act that was recently passed by
Congress, provide stronger tools for targets to attack and/or protect
themselves against patent trolls.

54
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 § 34(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in section of 35 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).

